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his power in so far as he is the producer and Lord of all things, in this
third Book we have still to deal with his perfect authority or majesty
(dignitate) in so far as he is the end and governor of all things.40
(1.1867a)
The chapters of Book III, then, must cover both those aspects of divine
providence: God as the ultimate goal of all created existence, and God’s
variously directing all things toward the goal that is (somehow) himself.
Therefore, we will have to proceed in the following order, so as to deal,
first, with God himself in so far as he is the end of all things [chaps.
2–63]; second, with his universal governance, in so far as he governs
every created thing [chaps. 64–110]; and, third, with his special govern-
ance, in so far as he governs creatures that have intellect [chaps.
111–163]. (1.1867b)
We will, of course, find subdivisions within those three broad topics as
we go along. For now, it will be enough to provide a preliminary sketch of
the subdivisions in the first of them. In III.2–15, Aquinas begins the devel-
opment by focusing on the concept of an end or goal, which he analyzes as
necessarily involving goodness, a result that seems to lead him to examine
the apparent prevalence of various sorts of badness in the goals and devel-
opments of created things. In III.16–24 he undertakes to explain just how
God himself is to be considered the ultimate goal of things in general. In
III.25–37, he argues for the central importance of human beings’ intellec-
tive cognition of God in their achieving the ultimate goal of human exist-
ence, and in III.38–47, he explores various conditions that he argues must
apply to human cognition in those special circumstances. Finally, in
III.48–63, he concludes his development of the first of those three grand
topics by trying to show just how an intellective cognition of God is the
principal ingredient in ultimate human happiness.
II. AGENTS, ACTIONS, AND ENDS
1. Thoroughgoing Teleology
Aquinas concludes his introductory chapter by announcing that his first
task in Book III, a task to which he devotes sixty-two chapters, is to investi-
gate “God himself in so far as he is the end of all things” (1.1867b). That
compressed description of a very big topic is likely to arouse some misgiv-
ings. Why should we think that absolutely all things do have ends or goals?
Even if we’re given good reasons to think that they do, why should we think
that all those ends or goals converge in a single end for all things? And even
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if we should be convinced of that, why should we think that that single
universal end must be identified (somehow) as God himself?
So it is encouraging to find Aquinas showing, in the opening sentence
of his second chapter, the first substantive chapter of Book III, that he
himself thinks that his compressed description requires him to begin by
addressing the first of those misgivings: “Therefore, the first thing we have to
show is that every agent in acting does intend some end” (2.1868). The founda-
tional importance of this teleological thesis to all the rest of Book III calls
for a close look at Aquinas’s development and defense of it.
The fact that he uses the words ‘agent’ (agens), ‘acting’ (agendo), and
‘intend’ (intendit) in expressing the thesis may suggest that he is construing it
too narrowly for it to be considered a claim about all things. But it soon
becomes clear that in this context, he is using those terms in technically
broad senses, such that an agent will be absolutely anything considered as the
active subject of any sort of movement or change, from a person’s making a
choice to a fire’s hardening a clay pot, and such that ‘intend’ (and ‘inten-
tion’) will apply not only to a person’s plan for coping with certain circum-
stances but also to fire’s propensity for hardening clay in certain
circumstances.41 Still, however he may go on to justify extensions of those
notions, the paradigms of agency, acting, intending, and ends are of course to
be found in the deliberate behavior of intellective beings, “things that are
obviously acting for an end” (2.1869). For that reason Aquinas borrows the
language of his broader descriptions from the way we talk about the mani-
festly purposive activity of beings like us. His first examples are a doctor
acting to restore a patient’s health, and a runner running toward a definite
goal. In observing how we talk about such cases he presents his initial account
of an end: “we say that the end is that toward which the agent’s impetus tends,
since we say that an agent that attains that attains its end, while one that falls
short of it we describe as falling short of its intended end” (2.1869).42
As a consequence of that account of an end, presented in unexception-
able broad observations regarding the clearest cases, Aquinas considers
himself entitled immediately to extend the use of ‘end’ into explanations
of the activities of a bigger class of things. The plausibility of the extension
is enhanced by the fact that the passage introduces the notion of an end in
language that isn’t restricted to intellective agents. And so, he says, “it makes
no difference in this respect whether that which tends toward an end is
cognizant [of it] or not; for just as the target is the archer’s end, so is it the
end of the arrow’s motion” (2.1869)—that is, so is it that toward which the
arrow’s impetus tends.43 In Aquinas’s project of showing that every thing
considered as an agent acts for an end, incognizant agents are obviously
going to make up the biggest and most obviously problematic class. Conse-
quently, it’s important to decide just how much bigger a class of things can
legitimately be included already, as a result of this very simple move. The
archer joins the doctor and the runner as a paradigmatic agent obviously
acting for an end. And if we focus on the feature of this new example that
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makes the extension plausible, it seems that the only extension warranted
so far is limited to just such incognizant things as are obviously directed by
cognizant agents. On that basis, the doctor’s ointments and the runner’s
shoes could join the archer’s arrows in the newly broadened class of things
that may be said to act for ends. But admitting incognizant instruments
deliberately employed by undoubtedly cognizant agents in order to achieve
their conscious goals is of course still a long way from accepting, say, a forest
fire started by lightning as the sort of thing that in its acting intends an end.
Aquinas’s move to include incognizant instruments among agents that
in acting do intend some end might suggest that the main purpose of this
first argument is to provide support for the universality of the teleology
thesis by expanding the class of things that can count as agents whose
activities are reasonably explained in terms of ends. He does return to
providing that sort of support later in the chapter, but it turns out that this
initial expansion—from intellective agents alone to intellective agents and
their instruments—is all that he wants along that line for now. What con-
cerns him more at this stage (2.1869–1872) is clarifying and expanding the
notion of an end.44 But, of course, the acceptability of the thesis depends
as much on what’s meant by ‘end’ in it as on expanding the class of things
that can be recognized as acting for ends. Since the ends of agents’ instru-
ments in their acting are identical with the ends of the agents themselves in
their acting,45 Aquinas’s first expansion of that class hasn’t required recog-
nizing as ends any things, events, or states of affairs beyond those we
ordinarily recognize as ends. And, of course, his teleology thesis will be
much stronger if he can develop and defend it without radically altering the
sense or reference of any of the crucial terms that make it up.
Having provided several examples of both cognizant and incognizant
agents whose actions are to be explained in terms of definite ends—healing
the patient, crossing the finish line, hitting the bull’s-eye—Aquinas turns his
attention for a moment to the definiteness of those ends, and generalizes at
once to the definiteness of every end of every sort of agent:
Now every agent’s impetus tends toward something definite (certum),
since not just any action proceeds from any given power, but heating
from heat, of course, and cooling from cold. It’s for that reason, too,
that actions differ in their species on the basis of the variety of active
[powers]. (2.1869)
‘Every agent’s impetus tends toward something definite’ has the look of a
strong claim, but I think that the perfunctory support Aquinas provides for
it helps to show that what he actually intends to claim here is weak to the
point of being truistic. Any agent engages in a certain sort of action only if
and only to the extent to which it possesses an active power the exercise of
which is a necessary condition for its engaging in an action of that sort. The
fire on the hearth warms the room not because of its active powers of
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lighting space or consuming fuel but just because of its active power of
heating air, which is the only possible source of that sort of action on the
part of that sort of agent.46 The specification of any action on the part of
any sort of agent entails that agent’s possession of an active power of the
appropriate sort. This truistic conclusion constitutes Aquinas’s first clarifi-
cation of the notion of an end.
And he goes on at once to clarify it further, ending this first argument
by introducing a distinction between kinds of ends:
Now an action sometimes [A] terminates in something that is brought
about (factum)—e.g., building terminates in a building, healing in
health; but sometimes [B] it doesn’t—e.g., intellective and sensory
activity. And if [A] an action does indeed terminate in something that
is brought about, then the agent’s impetus tends, through the action,
toward the thing that is brought about; while if [B] an action doesn’t
terminate in anything that is brought about, then the agent’s impetus
tends toward the action itself. Therefore, every agent, in acting, must
intend an end: sometimes, indeed, [B] the action itself, but sometimes
[A] something that is brought about through the action. (2.1869)
Before evaluating this last part of the first argument, I want to say
something about the unusual character of the whole argument. Although
Aquinas presents it and the chapter’s other arguments as if they were so
many alternative sources of support for the chapter’s thesis, and although
their conclusions are or contain restatements of the chapter’s thesis (as
would be expected in arguments of that sort), and although each of them
does in some way or other support some aspect of the thesis, several of
them, including 2.1869, are more importantly presenting clarifications of
the notion of an end and thus clarifications of the thesis. Each of these
arguments makes its own contribution(s) to the clarification process or
offers further support for a clarification made in a preceding argument,
and so we can’t simply focus on what we take to be the strongest one or two
among them. Appreciating all that this first argument has to offer as sup-
port for the teleology thesis is easier if we give the argument a conclusion
more complex than the one Aquinas provides for it (quoted above)—per-
haps something like this: Therefore, every agent, not merely intellective
agents but their incognizant instruments as well, in acting, whether primar-
ily or instrumentally, intends, or in its impetus tends toward, some end, which
must be something definite, and which can be either something brought
about by the agent’s acting or the acting itself.
In order to achieve any end, an agent must engage in some action. And
so an end of type A, the type in connection with which the notion of an end
is probably most familiar, can be construed technically as an ulterior end,
one to which the agent’s impetus tends “through the action.” Paradigms of
type A will involve actions that are naturally necessitated or deliberately
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designed to terminate in specifically definite results—for example, fire’s
hardening clay, or your going to the store for groceries. On the other hand,
intellective or sensory activities, Aquinas’s paradigms of type B, are so
flexible in nature and so nearly constantly engaged in, willy-nilly, that they
can’t be considered to be naturally necessitated to terminate in any prede-
termined set of specifically definite results. But they can of course be
deliberately designed to terminate in something that is brought about: you
may look in order to find your keys, or think in order to choose among the
vegetables in the store. Furthermore, thought and sensation are often,
probably most often, engaged in for their own sakes, or at least not for the
sake of any definite result. So, at least sometimes, such activities as looking
and thinking are engaged in without any ulterior ends—that is, as immedi-
ate ends in their own right and as ends that are also ultimate, at least in the
sense of serving no ulterior purpose.
2. Ultimate Ends
Aquinas’s Chapter 2 is the beginning of his detailed investigation of a
large-scale topic: God considered as the universal end of created things.
When the chapter’s teleology thesis is viewed in the light of that topic, we
can see that every agent will have to turn out to intend not merely some end
of its own but one and the same end, which will have to turn out (somehow)
to be God himself. And if that extension of the thesis is to have any hope of
being taken seriously, it will have to be interpreted as a claim about God not
as the immediate but rather as the single ultimate end of all creaturely
activities. It seems fair to say that we have no reliable evidence that God is
in any way the immediate goal of anything that creatures do, aside from
religious activity. Besides, we’ve already seen Aquinas expressly describing
God as creatures’ ultimate goal.47 For those reasons, it’s especially important
for Aquinas’s development of his thesis, even before God has been explicitly
reintroduced into it, that he examine the concept of an ultimate end and
add it to the aspects of ends he will need as this investigation develops.
He starts that examination with a definition illustrated in terms of
paradigmatic agents and ends:
as regards all things acting for an end, we say that the ultimate end is
that beyond which the agent doesn’t seek (quaerit) anything else. For
instance, the doctor’s  action  continues  right  up to [the patient’s]
health; but when that has been achieved, he doesn’t try for (conatur)
anything further. (2.1870)
This is clear and unobjectionable, as long as we understand that the ulti-
macy that’s being defined and illustrated here must be thought of as relative
(1) to agents (since health as Aquinas introduces it here will not also be a
108 NORMAN KRETZMANN
builder’s ultimate end48) and should probably be thought of as relative also
(2) to agents’ other ends—that is, as that beyond which the agent doesn’t
try for anything further in one particular line of endeavor, rather than at all.49
A doctor’s action, considered just as such, could have no goal beyond his
patient’s health, but the intellective agent who happens to be the doctor will
surely have personal goals that lie beyond the health of any and every
patient of his (and will almost surely have goals beyond his own health).
Health is the undoubted, absolutely ultimate end of a doctor’s actions con-
sidered only as medical actions definitive of doctoring. But Aquinas, perhaps
ignoring the fact that the ultimacy introduced here isn’t absolute, argues
for its universal application:
in connection with the action of any agent at all there must be found
something beyond which the agent doesn’t seek anything else, since
otherwise actions would tend to infinity—which is of course impossible.
For [if actions did tend to infinity] an agent would not begin to act,
since it is impossible to get through infinitely many.50 For nothing is
moved toward that at which it is impossible to arrive. Therefore, every
agent acts for an end. (2.1870)
Despite its conclusion’s simplified restatement of the chapter’s thesis,
this argument seems designed to support the new claim that every agent
acts for an ultimate end. But, in any case, the argument is flawed. It looks as
if it’s meant to be based on a Zenonian can’t-get-started paradox, like the
one in which the runner can’t get to the goal without running half the
distance and, moreover, can’t get to the halfway point without running a
quarter of the distance, and so on.51 What Aquinas actually presents here,
however, seems to amount to no more than a case of won’t-get-started-if-the-
impossibility-of-arriving-is-acknowledged. After all, many people tried to
square the circle or to build a perpetual-motion machine. It seems plainly
false that “nothing is moved toward that at which it is impossible to arrive,”
even if no rational person, considered just as such, is moved toward attain-
ing what that person acknowledges to be unattainable.52 And as for “it is
impossible to get through infinitely many,” its applicability here is at least
dubious. Why shouldn’t an agent discover unforeseen successive ultimate
ends, especially if ultimacy is understood as Aquinas introduces it here? All
S wants is one million dollars, and he doesn’t try for anything further, and
when he gets it he’s satisfied—for a while, after which he decides that now
all he really wants  is two million dollars, and so  on.53 Obviously, such
relatively ultimate ends could in theory go on ad infinitum successively, but
that sort of progression of infinitely many goals needn’t prevent or even
deter any agent from getting started. All that would be definitely ruled out
by infinity of this sort is the possibility of total, final success. And if this
argument is supposed to apply to non-intellective agents, too, it shows signs
of an analogous sort of failure. For although Aquinas thinks of getting to
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the center of the earth as an ultimate end for every terrestrial body, and
although every one of them is indeed moved toward the center of the earth,
any body’s actual arrival at the center of the earth is a real impossibility.54
The concept of an ultimate end is important enough for Aquinas’s
purposes that he offers two more arguments in support of its universal
applicability. The first makes use of the distinction between ends of type
A—things, events, or states of affairs brought about by actions—and ends
of type B—actions themselves.
If an agent’s actions do go on ad infinitum, then it must be that either
something that is brought about follows from those actions or not. If
something that is brought about does follow, then of course its exist-
ence will follow after infinitely many actions. But it is impossible for
anything to be if it presupposes infinitely many, since it is impossible to
get through infinitely many. But what cannot be cannot be brought
about, and nothing can bring about what cannot be brought about.
Therefore, it is impossible that an agent begin to bring about some-
thing for which infinitely many actions are presupposed. (2.1871)
This part of the argument, dealing with ends of type A, could be adapted
to provide solid support for the claim that no agent could succeed in bring-
ing about something for which infinitely many actions are presupposed—if
there were any purpose to be served by supporting such a claim. But, for
reasons brought out in considering this argument’s immediate predecessor,
it can’t support its conclusion about the impossibility of an agent’s beginning
such a process. And so this part of the argument doesn’t show us that every
agent, or any agent, must have an ultimate end of type A.
The rest of the argument does no better as regards ultimate ends of
type B:
If, however, something that is brought about does not follow from those
actions, then the ordering of the actions must be either [1] in accord-
ance with the ordering of active powers—e.g., if a person senses in
order to imagine, and imagines in order to think (intelligat), and thinks
in order to will—or [2] in accordance with an ordering of objects—e.g.,
I consider the body in order to consider the soul, which I consider in
order to consider a separated substance,55 which I consider in order to
consider God. (2.1871)
I’m interrupting this second part of the argument here in order to raise a
question. Aquinas provides no basis at all for his very strong claim that only
these two kinds of orderings—of active powers and of objects—are available
as bases for the ordering of actions. But even if we leave that claim unques-
tioned, we can raise a question about the second ordering. Why shouldn’t
I consider the body in order to consider the soul, and then find myself led
by that consideration to a better-informed consideration of the body, which
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leads to a better-informed consideration of the soul, and so on, back and
forth, indefinitely? This argument is already in trouble, and it gets worse.
But one cannot go on ad infinitum, whether [1] regarding active
powers, . . .56 or [2] regarding objects (just as not regarding beings,
since, as was proved earlier [in I.42], there is one first being). There-
fore, it is not possible that actions go on ad infinitum. Therefore, there
must be something such that the agent’s striving (conatus) comes to rest
in the possession of it. Therefore, every agent acts for an end. (2.1871)
As for [1], Aquinas’s philosophy of mind provides an elaborate rationale
for the ordered list of active powers that plays a crucial role in this argu-
ment, but I see no reason why the ordering and the finiteness of that list
should entail that your own cognitive and volitional acts must follow that
order and come to a stop when they reach volition.57 Aside from the kind
of objection I’ve already raised, why shouldn’t you sometimes follow just
that order, but then will to sense—in order to imagine, and so on, round
and round, theoretically ad infinitum? Although the case made here for
the finiteness of a series of actions based on [2] an ordering of objects
isn’t much better in its details, it has the advantage of including God
himself as the object beyond which cognitive and volitional activities really
cannot find another. At this stage of SCG no additional argument is
needed for the claim that God is the single ultimate end of intellection,
but that claim is certainly not all that this argument is out to show, and
what else it aims at it misses.
Aquinas’s third and last argument concerned with ultimate ends in this
chapter is no more successful than the other two, and it provides grounds
for a further misgiving. “In connection with things that act for an end, all
the intermediaries between the primary agent and the ultimate end are
ends in respect of those that precede them and active principles in respect
of those that follow them” (2.1872). The further misgiving is stirred by this
universalized observation, which seems to imply a simple linear depiction
of any individual’s active principles and ends. Because of the way Aquinas
introduced the concept of ultimacy in this context, and because there are
no definite (or indefinite) articles in Latin, it’s not quite clear whether he’s
assigning exactly one ultimate end to each thing that acts for an end
(although of course ‘ultimate’ strongly suggests ‘unique’).58 But if he is,
then he seems to be claiming that a successful agent’s entire goal-oriented
career, from beginning to end, is depicted in a schema as simply linear as
this (where ap 5 active principle):59
ap r action r end/ap r action r end/ap r. . . ultimate end.
But, of course, it’s much more plausible that the depiction of an agent’s
goal-oriented career requires a schema characterized by forking paths and
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parallel lines—that is, that not every achieved end is transformed into an
active principle giving rise to progress in just one direction. Short-run
sequences of this sort are very familiar: a need for food leads you to shop,
the groceries provide the basis for making a meal, the prepared meal
provides an occasion for eating. But while shopping, you’re thinking about
going to a movie that evening, and while the meal is being made, you’re
talking with your spouse about a movie to go to—and so on, and so on.
Nonetheless, Aquinas ends this argument by relying on the already chal-
lenged rigidity of his ordered list of active powers or principles in order to
draw what seems to be a truncated conclusion:
Therefore, if an agent’s striving is not directed toward anything deter-
minate (determinatum), but its actions go on ad infinitum, then active
principles must go on ad infinitum. But that’s impossible, as was shown
before. Therefore, it is necessary that an agent’s striving be directed
toward something determinate. (2.1872)
Apart from problems I’ve already raised about Aquinas’s use of his list of
active principles in this connection, I don’t see why any impossibility should
attach to an infinite progress of active principles, which is all that’s at issue
here. And I’m a little puzzled by his focusing in this conclusion not on the
ultimacy of ends but on their determinateness, which I take to be the same
as the definiteness he’s already argued for (in 2.1869).
If, as seems fairly clear, Aquinas’s aim in these three arguments
(2.1870–72) is to show that agents have to have ultimate ends, he would
have done better to make prominent use of a simple, well-known Aristote-
lian line of thought that appears in these arguments only in a parenthetical
reference.60 The fact that he uses that line effectively in SCG I makes it seem
only odder that he doesn’t use it here as well:
In the case of any willer, what is principally willed is a cause of [the
willer’s] volition. For when we say ‘I want to walk in order to be
healthy’, we consider ourselves to be indicating a [final] cause; and if
someone asks ‘Why do you want to be healthy?’, we will go on assigning
causes until we arrive at the ultimate end, which is what is principally
willed, which is [in turn] a cause of volition altogether on its own.61
(74.635)
3. Natural Agents, Likeness, and Efficient Causation
Although Aquinas’s claims about ends must eventually suit explanations of
all sorts of actions by all sorts of agents, he understandably develops most of
what he has to say about them (in 2.1869–72) in terms of the efforts, powers,
objects, and aims that we know best—those that are most readily, or exclu-
sively, associated with human beings. However, since the chapter’s teleology
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thesis—“every agent in acting does intend some end”—needs support most
obviously in respect of its universality, it’s not surprising that he also devotes
part of the remainder of the chapter to a further and much more sweeping
expansion of the class of agents, things whose activities are reasonably ex-
plained in terms of ends. He argues now for including within that class not
merely intellective creatures and their nonintellective instruments but also
all “natural agents,” all the way down through olive trees to fires.
Every agent acts either through its [nonintellective] nature [alone] or
through its intellect. Now as regards those that act through intellect,
there is no doubt that they act for an end. For when they act, they
preconceive in intellect what they achieve through action, and they act
on the basis of that sort of preconception. That’s what it is to act
through intellect. (2.1873)
In opening the argument with this brief review of the paradigmatic sort
of agent, Aquinas introduces an account of paradigmatic intention: an
agent’s intellective preconception of what is to be achieved through the
agent’s action. It is entirely plausible that such a preconception should
involve a projected likeness of the intended result, but what Aquinas infers
from that feature of paradigmatic intention needs some explaining and
defending.
Now just as in a preconceiving intellect there is a whole likeness of the
effect that is [to be] arrived at through the intellective agent’s actions,
so in a natural agent there pre-exists a natural likeness of the effect—a
likeness by which the action is determined to this or that effect. For a fire
generates a fire, and an olive tree generates an olive tree. Therefore,
an agent that acts through its [nonintellective] nature [alone] tends
toward a determinate end through its own action just as an agent that
acts through intellect does. Therefore, every agent acts for an end.
(2.1873)
The argument’s casual assimilation of a natural agent’s substantial form
to an intellective agent’s preconception can seem exaggerated, but all Aqui-
nas really needs here is a rough analogy between kinds of likeness, intellec-
tive (or imagined) and natural. And as long as the natural action at issue is
reproductive generation, one thing’s generating another thing of the same
kind, it’s not unreasonable to present a natural agent’s substantial form as a
likeness that determines the effect—not a preconception, of course, but a
species-specific prefiguring. But reproductive generation is only one sort of
natural action. A fire doesn’t only start other fires, it also brings about
hardness in clay and softness in wax; and neither hardness nor softness
appears to be an aspect of fire’s substantial form. Does Aquinas suppose that
fire somehow contains likenesses of hardness and softness as well? Yes, he
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does. The way he does so and his grounds for doing so are spelled out in Book
I, but they’re essential to his theory of efficient causation and so worth
reviewing here in connection with the development of his theory of agency.62
In several places Aquinas develops a general account of kinds of like-
ness,63 beginning with the basic observation that if X can literally and truly be
said to be like Y in any way at all, then X has some form that Y also has.64 Fun-
damentally, then, likeness is con-formity, partial sameness in respect of some-
how sharing at least one form. Likeness shows up in many different contexts,
of course. But our present concern is solely with likeness in connection with
efficient causation or agency, cases in which the preconceived or prefigured
effect is also thought of as the end for which the efficient cause, conceived of
as an agent, acts. We can, then, focus exclusively on Aquinas’s analysis of the
kinds of likeness obtaining between an efficient cause and its effect.
He thinks of efficient causation as one thing’s (natural or artificial)
production of another thing, or event, or state of affairs. He understands
this in terms of an agent’s (or active subject’s) initiating the sharing with a
patient (or passive object) of some form the agent possesses antecedently,
often in some way quite different from the way in which the patient comes
to possess the shared form. (Because I’m adopting Aquinas’s under-
standing of efficient causation for present purposes, I’ll write in terms of
‘agent causation.’65) Some sort of likeness between an effect and its cause
is an immediate consequence of this notion of agent causation, since agent
causation shares a necessary condition with likeness: If A is the agent and P
is the patient, then A antecedently somehow has some form, f, that P also
somehow has, consequently—even where A is a fire, P is a clay pot, and f is
hardness. In agent causation the effect that is brought about by A’s exercise
of some active power is the informing of P with f.66
Agent causation, then, entails a con-formity between cause and effect:
Since every agent does something like itself insofar as it is an agent, but
each thing acts in keeping with a form belonging to it, it is necessary
that there be in the effect a [consequent] likeness of a form belonging
to the agent. (ST Ia.4.3c)
Clearly, ‘likeness’ (similitudo) is a technical term in this context, closer to ‘cor-
respondence’ than to ‘resemblance’ in the ordinary sense, even if in some
cases the correspondence may be detailed enough to count as resemblance.
The only immediately relevant con-formity between an agent cause and its ef-
fect is the presence in the effect of characteristics that could serve to identify
or at least to type the agent—physical or metaphysical clues providing the ba-
sis for an inductive argument to some aspects of the agent’s nature.
Agent causation does not include the generation of accidental effects,
effects that couldn’t also count as ends in the circumstances in which they
occur: “what is generated by something accidentally is not generated by it in so
far as it is of such-and-such a sort, and so in what generates something there
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need not be a likeness of what is generated” just because in cases of accidental
generation there is no antecedent likeness of the effect, which is at least often
what we would call a chance effect.67 “For example, the discovery of a treas-
ure has no [antecedent] likeness in the person who finds the treasure acci-
dentally while digging in order to plant something” (In Met. VII: L8.1443).
On the other hand, the person’s deliberately digging in order to plant
something is an agent’s acting for an end: it does have an antecedent likeness
in the digger’s preconception and is an instance of (intellective or artificial
rather than natural) agent causation. And if the treasure had been uncov-
ered, instead, by a storm’s uprooting a tree, then (natural) agent causation
would account only for features of the cause that could be inferred from the
effect, such as the direction and force of the wind, forms belonging to A as
powers that constitute in A an antecedent likeness of the effect in P, but a
likeness that can’t be construed as a manifest resemblance of the sort that
characterizes an olive tree’s generating another olive tree, or yet another
tree’s being ignited by the flames of a forest fire.
That strongest sort of likeness possible between an effect and its cause
considered just as such—substantial-form likeness—is the kind associated
with the sort of agent causation that requires the inclusion of the agent
cause and its effect within the same species. Biological reproduction is the
paradigm but, as we’ve already seen, not the only instance, since reproduc-
tive generation occurs also in non-living things: “if the agent is included in
the same species along with its effect, then between the maker and what is
made there will be a likeness in form that is in keeping with the same ratio
as is associated with the species—for instance, [when] a human being
generates a human being” (ST Ia.4.3c), or “when the form of what is
generated is antecedently in the generator in the same mode of being, and
in similar matter—for instance, when a fire generates a fire” (In Met. VII:
L8.1444), or when “heat produces heat” (In Sent. I.8.1.2c).
Aquinas uses the word ‘ratio’ often and importantly in these discussions
in ways that seem to rule out a single fully satisfactory translation for it,
mainly because in its various occurrences it conveys a variously propor-
tioned blend of meaning, definition, concept, model, and essential nature. ‘Theo-
retical account’ or ‘intelligible nature’ might come close to being
acceptable as a single equivalent, but I’ll leave ratio in Latin here, occasion-
ally commenting on what I take to be its sense. In the example of human
reproduction in these passages the form is evidently humanity, and the ratio
associated with the species is pretty clearly the definiens rational animal,
which is necessarily suited to both the agent and its effect because they’re
both members of the human species.68
‘Mode’ is another term used importantly in these passages on same-
species agent causation and elsewhere in Aquinas’s account of likeness,
causal and otherwise. Sometimes, as here, it picks out the way in which the
shared form is realized in the cause and in the effect: flesh and bone in the
example of human reproduction. But Aquinas uses ‘mode’ in this context
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also to indicate the degree to which the shared form is realized in the cause
and in the effect. In the examples of human beings or olive trees or fires
generating others of their kind, the mode in this second sense is essentially
just the same, since the ratio is realized completely in both cause and effect.
This strongest sort of causal likeness supports an altogether univocal
application of the same species-term both to the agent cause (which is more
conveniently designated ‘C’ here) and to its effect, E (where the effect is P’s
having been informed with f ). For that reason Aquinas calls this sort of
agent causation univocal. The detailed essential likeness of E to its univocal
agent cause C and the fact that ‘human being,’ ‘olive tree,’ or ‘fire’ is
predicable univocally of both C and E in such cases is founded on three (or
four) samenesses: (1) the same form, f, is antecedently in C and conse-
quently in E; (2) f is associated with the same ratio in both C and E;69 (3a)
f is essentially realized in the same way in both C and E, and (3b) f is
essentially realized to the same degree in both C and E.70
Obviously, univocal causation can’t be the relationship that accounts for
a fire’s hardening clay. The fact that in univocal causation the form shared by
C and E is realized in the same way and to the same degree is guaranteed by
the facts that the relationship between C and E must be the reproductive gen-
eration of one member of a species by another member of the same species,
and that, consequently, the form that C and E share must be their substantial
form. But if C and E are not included in a single species, then E does not agree
with C “in name and ratio. Nonetheless, it’s necessary that some likeness be
found between them, for it’s part of the nature of action that an agent does
what is like itself, since each thing acts in keeping with its being in actuality
(secundum quod actu est) [—not in a state of mere potentiality]. That’s why the
form of the effect is indeed found somehow in a cause that [essentially] sur-
passes its effect, but in another mode, and in connection with another ratio.
And for that reason [such a cause] is called an equivocal cause” (SCG
I.29.270). The fire is an equivocal cause of hardness in the clay (or of softness
in the wax). And if C is an equivocal cause of E, then (1) the same form, f, is
antecedently in C and consequently in E; but (29) it is not the case that f is as-
sociated with the same ratio in C and in E;71 (3a9) it is not the case that f is es-
sentially realized in the same way in C and in E; and (3b9) it is not the case that
f is essentially realized to the same degree in C and in E.
Only the already discounted accidental efficient causation could be
purely equivocal (as natural reproductive generation is purely univocal).
Only of accidental efficient causation would it be true also that (19) it is not
the case that the same form is antecedently in C and consequently in E.
Purely equivocal causation is efficient causation by chance as pure equivo-
cation is terminological sameness by chance.72 So a fire’s hardening clay
isn’t an instance of purely equivocal causation. Adapting Aquinas’s use of the
sun as his model of an equivocal efficient cause in SCG I.29.270, we can say
of the fire that the hardness it causes in the clay must have some sort of
likeness not to the fire itself as we ordinarily experience it, but to the fire
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understood in terms of its active powers. The form of hardness that is
consequently in the clay is antecedently in that one of the fire’s active
powers that can be provisionally (and truistically) identified as its clay-hard-
ening power. (And, of course, the form of hardness is antecedently also in
the clay’s passive potentialities to some extent.73) It’s in respect of its active
powers that the fire, or any other agent, can be said to be somehow like all
its equivocal effects, to possess antecedently, albeit in a different mode, the
forms that are found consequently in its equivocal effects. To acquire a
more fine-grained understanding of the fire’s clay-hardening power is to see
more clearly just how the form of hardened clay is antecedently in the fire
(and in the clay)—that is, just how fire hardens clay.
So, when we look more closely at Aquinas’s account that interrelates
likeness and causation, an account he has some right to presuppose at this
stage of SCG, we can appreciate and, I think, accept the analogies on which
he bases his conclusions in 2.1871: “Therefore, an agent that acts through
its [non-intellective] nature [alone] tends toward a determinate end
through its own action just as an agent that acts through intellect does.
Therefore, every agent acts for an end.”
4. Shortcomings as Evidence of Teleology
The created world as we know it, including ourselves in several different
respects, is undeniably marred by many imperfections or shortcomings of
various sorts. Aquinas ingeniously uses this feature of reality (and, even
more markedly, of our view of reality) as another basis on which to argue
for the universality of his teleology thesis. In his view, the fact that we can’t
deny the prevalence of failures and flaws is one good reason why we can’t
avoid thinking teleologically.
Shortcomings are found only in things that are for an end. For if a thing
falls short (deficiat) of something it isn’t aimed at, that isn’t ascribed to it
as a shortcoming; if a doctor falls short of healing, that’s ascribed as a
shortcoming to him, but not to a builder, or a grammarian. (2.1874)
This stage-setting part of the argument calls for a terminological comment.
The best efforts of the best doctors do sometimes fall short of healing; and
while all such shortcomings may be disappointing, not all of them are avoid-
able, let alone blameworthy. Still, Aquinas’s example suggests, even that sort
of unavoidable failure to achieve the agent’s end counts as a shortcoming in
the agent. ‘Shortcoming’ is my translation here for ‘peccatum.’ Because Aqui-
nas also uses ‘peccatum’ elsewhere for moral fault or sin, someone could think
that even in contexts like this one ‘peccatum’ carries connotations of blame-
worthiness.74 But we’ll see, as Aquinas develops his general analysis of bad-
ness over the next several chapters of Book III, that he approaches even the
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worst sorts of moral evil as extrapolations from the least troubling sorts of
natural defects, including some that are too familiar or too far removed from
us to be considered even disappointments.75 Consequently, in his analysis of
badness, shortcoming is the genus of evil, and not conversely. And the rest of
this present argument shows that a negative assessment as broad and cool as
‘shortcoming’ is needed here, as well.
Now we do find shortcomings in things that are done in connection with
art, as when a grammarian speaks incorrectly. But we also find shortcom-
ings in those that occur in connection with nature, as is clear in cases of
congenital deformities (partubus monstruosis). Therefore, an agent that
acts in accordance with nature acts for an end just as truly as an agent
that acts in accordance with art and on the basis of a plan. (2.1874)
A grammarian’s speaking incorrectly is presumably always avoidable in
theory. If it’s being done for pedagogical purposes, it is an utterly undeplor-
able shortcoming; and if it is being done unconsciously, it is always deplor-
able, as some of a doctor’s shortcomings are not. But from the case of the
erring grammarian, which edges closer to blameworthiness, Aquinas moves
at once to a much worse sort of shortcoming in what seems to be a very differ-
ent setting, one that involves no prima facie eligible target of blame. Medical
and grammatical shortcomings are artificial, and the agents to whom they
are ascribable are readily identified. Congenital deformities are natural, and
the agent (or agents) to which they are ascribable is (or are) not always as un-
mistakably apparent. Against the background built up in SCG so far, it may
seem natural to suspect that God himself must be the agent to whom natural
shortcomings are to be ascribed. It will of course be very important to dis-
cover and assess what Aquinas has to say on that point, but in any event we nei-
ther must nor should look immediately for divine agency in things that occur
in connection with nature.76 In reproductive generation, the production of
another olive tree is an olive tree’s naturally necessitated effect. And, Aquinas
is arguing here, our recognition that a blighted, stunted, sterile, or otherwise
congenitally defective olive seedling counts as a shortcoming should show us
that an olive tree, “an agent that acts in accordance with nature[,] acts for an
end just as truly as an agent that acts in accordance with art and on the basis of
a plan”—such as a doctor or a grammarian. The production of another olive
tree is a reproducing olive tree’s naturally necessitated effect, but the produc-
tion of a normal, healthy olive tree is the natural end of an olive tree in respect
of reproductive generation.
5. Determinate Ends as Necessary Conditions of Action
Aquinas’s final argument in support of III.2’s teleology thesis applies more
effectively to non-living than to living agents.
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If an agent didn’t tend toward any determinate effect, then all effects
would be indifferent to it. But what is related indifferently to many
things doesn’t do one of them rather than another. (It’s for that reason
that no effect follows from what is contingent in either of two ways
unless something determines it to one of them.77) Therefore, it would
be impossible for such a thing to act. Therefore, every agent tends
toward some determinate effect, which is called its end. (2.1875)
Buridan’s Ass, the untethered donkey that starves to death between two
equally tempting piles of hay, each of them precisely ten feet away from the
donkey’s head, is the paradigm of the sort of agent Aquinas is depicting
here: one that is supposed to be incapacitated by an absence of relevant
differences among available alternatives. Such force as this argument has
stems from its dependence on a version of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason.78 But no one believes that a real donkey would behave the way
Buridan’s Ass behaves in the story—which is obviously meant to lampoon
rigid rationality—and rational agents are perhaps even less likely than
donkeys to be stymied by options that are equally attractive. As Aquinas
himself observes elsewhere,
it depends on the simple volition of the artisan that this stone is in this
part of the wall, and that one in another part, even though the nature
of his art demands that some stones be in this part and some in that
part. (ST Ia.23.5, ad 3)
When the particular alternatives are all equally suitable in all relevant
respects, then simply picking at random, rather than rationally choosing, is
what’s called for. If decision is a component of the process at all, it’s
exercised by will alone in an act of “simple volition,” without any particular
input from intellect. So it seems clear that this argument of Aquinas’s
doesn’t show  that a theoretical absence of relevant differences among
alternatives makes action impossible for intellective agents or even for
non-human animals. But it might be said to suggest that in such (very rare)
cases something—such as the  mason’s aim of  finishing the wall, or  the
donkey’s aim of getting rid of hunger pangs—has to intervene to bring
about action by determining an end. Genuinely incapacitating indifference
is much more likely to be found among non-living things.79
6. Some Apparent Exceptions
As I said near the beginning of this consideration of Aquinas’s teleology
thesis, incognizant natural things make up the biggest and most obviously
problematic class of agents to be covered by the thesis. Aquinas has now
provided at least a pattern for applying the thesis to any of them, especially
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in 2.1873, discussed in sect. 3 above. But intellective agents like us can
provide apparent exceptions of a very different sort, since we may think that
introspection provides conclusive evidence that some of the things we do
are not done for ends. Aquinas provides three kinds of cases: “contemplative
actions,” “playful actions,” and “actions that are done absentmindedly (abs-
que attentione), such as rubbing one’s beard” (2.1876a).
Suppose I ask you what you’re thinking about, and you tell me “irra-
tional numbers,” and I ask, “What’s the point of that?” You may very well
tell me, impatiently, that there’s no point to it; it’s just what you happen to
be thinking about. But that doesn’t mean that your thinking in that way is
acting for no end since, as Aquinas plausibly claimed earlier, the ends for
which some activities are engaged in—intellective and sensory activities
especially—are just the activities themselves.80 And that’s what he reminds
us of here: “We should know that contemplative actions are not for any other
end; instead, they themselves are the end” (2.1876b).
Playful actions haven’t been mentioned before, but they don’t give him
any trouble, either. Suppose that I interrupt you while you’re studying and
ask you to play a game of checkers, and you agree. And, to guarantee
playfulness, suppose that neither of us is interested in or good at checkers,
and that we don’t care who wins. Is there really some end for which you’re
acting as you play the game? Aquinas would say that there is, and I think
that his affirmative answer again makes plausible use of his distinction
between ends of type A and of type B: “playful actions sometimes [B] are an
end, when a person plays just for the pleasure there is in playing, and
sometimes [A] are for an end, as when we play so that we may study better
afterwards” (2.1876b).81
If we think of every movement of our bodies that is under our control
as an action of ours, then very many, maybe most, of our bodily actions are
absentminded. It’s only this one of the three sorts of putative exceptions for
which Aquinas supplies an example, and I think his example unfairly helps
his case:
actions that are done absentmindedly are brought about not by intel-
lect [of course] but by some unanticipated event in one’s imagina-
tion(subita imaginatione), or by some natural principle. For instance, a
disordering of the [bodily] humor that gives rise to itching is the cause
of one’s rubbing one’s beard, which is done in the absence of intellect’s
attention. And these actions do tend toward some end, although out-
side (praeter) the bounds of intellect’s ordering. (2.1876b)
The man may not have realized that he was rubbing his beard, much less
why he was doing so, until he’s asked. But then, surely, he says at once,
“Because it was itching.” That’s too easy. Just because of dealing with this
topic, I’ve been noticing the positions of my hands as I sit back to read
what’s on the computer screen before I go on typing. I notice that some-
120 NORMAN KRETZMANN
times they’re on the keyboard, sometimes in my lap; sometimes my arms
are folded; sometimes I have my right hand on my chin, sometimes my left;
etc., etc. I feel as detached from all such actions of mine as I would if I were
observing them in someone else, and Aquinas has certainly not provided
enough evidence to convince me that every one of these absentminded
positionings of my hands is brought about by some unanticipated event in
my imagination, or by some natural principle. Of course, if that language
of his is taken to be, not implausibly, a thirteenth-century version of the
claim that some brain state of mine accounts for those absentminded,
ordinarily unnoticed positions of my hands, I would grant it. And in that
case, perhaps, I can even see how one might, on the model of Aquinas’s
explaining fire’s hardening of clay as its acting for an end, go on to claim
that the purely absentminded positioning of my hands is to be explained as
the achieving of the end of some natural process taking place in my body,
although, strictly speaking, I can’t be identified as the agent of that action.82
That is, some movements made by an intellective agent that give the appear-
ance of deliberate actions, and that in other circumstances certainly could
be deliberate actions, may nevertheless be not the actions of an intellective
agent considered just as such but merely naturally necessitated effects of
natural principles and processes in the agent’s body. The passage quoted
just above, in which Aquinas tries to deal with absentminded movements,
contains suggestions that might be developed along such lines. But if he
had any such developments in view, he ought not to have used as his only
example absentmindedly rubbing a beard that itches.
It’s a little surprising that Aquinas develops and defends his teleology
thesis along the lines we’ve been examining without even mentioning final
causation. But in III.2’s final sentence, it emerges as a concept that he has
of course recognized as supplying one way in which to read the thesis: “Now
on this basis we rule out a mistake made by ancient natural philosophers,
who claimed that all things happen because of matter’s necessity, entirely
removing the final cause from things” (2.1877).83 Aquinas casts this devel-
opment and defense of the thesis in terms of agents, actions, and ends
because those terms are more exactly suited to the purposes of his project
in SCG III than is the more abstract ‘final causation.’
7. Every Agent’s End is Good
Aquinas introduces the thesis of III.3 as something that must be taken up
at this stage: “Now on that basis we have to show, further, that every agent
acts for what is good” (3.1878). It might occur to someone that this is
what Aquinas has to show, further, because he’s dealing “first, with God
himself in so far as he is the end of all things” (1.1867b), and what he’s
shown in the preceding chapter, III.2, is that all things do act for an end.
Since that end must eventually be shown to be God, there’s progress to
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be made in showing, further, that what every agent acts for is something
good. But that interpretation of this particular move would be mistaken in
two ways.
In the first place, there’s a scope-ambiguity in the teleology thesis that
forms the basis for this new thesis. ‘Every agent intends some end’ may be
read either as (I) ‘For every agent, x, there is some end, y, such that x
intends y’ or as (II) ‘There is some end, y, such that for every agent, x, x
intends y.’ (I) is clearly the interpretation that has been at issue in III.2, and
anyone prepared to say that Aquinas has at least made considerable pro-
gress in developing and defending his teleology thesis will also be taking
interpretation (I) for granted. However, although interpretation (I) is the
one at issue so far, and although it’s much less implausible than (II), it
certainly does look as if Aquinas will need to establish (II) eventually on his
way to showing that God himself is the one and only end of all things. And
there’s a related ambiguity in the goodness thesis of III.3 that can, on one
interpretation, make it look like a bold move in the direction of (II). For
‘omne agens agit propter bonum’ might be read not merely as ‘every agent acts
for what is good’ or ‘. . . a good’ or ‘. . . something good,’ but, more
narrowly, as ‘every agent acts for the good’ or even ‘. . . goodness.’
But, in the second place, Aquinas’s development and defense of the
goodness thesis in III.3 shows unmistakably and from its very beginning that
at this stage he intends only the first and less implausible of those two
interpretations of it.84
In his first argument for the goodness thesis Aquinas reveals not only
what he means by it but also how he understands it to be based on the
teleology thesis. “For the fact that any and every agent tends toward some-
thing determinate makes it clear that every agent acts for an end. But that
toward which an agent tends determinately must be appropriate (conveni-
ens) for it, since the agent wouldn’t tend toward it if it weren’t somehow
appropriate for itself. But whatever is appropriate for anything is good for
it. Therefore, every agent acts for something good” (3.1879). It is, of course,
this argument’s use of ‘appropriate for it,’ ‘appropriate for itself,’ and, most
directly, ‘good for it’ that show clearly that Aquinas intends the goodness
thesis in its more plausible sense. The argument’s first premise might be
read as implying that Aquinas takes the argument from determinateness to
be the most effective support for the teleology thesis, which would be
surprising.85 But I think he uses it here just because it strikes him as
providing the most convenient basis on which to make the transition to the
goodness thesis. The fact, if it is a fact, that societies and other systems tend
toward disorder doesn’t constitute a counter-instance to the strong claim in
the first premise. Systems may not count as agents, even under Aquinas’s
very broad notion of an agent. More importantly, even disorder itself is not
indeterminacy but may be considered a determinate end toward which a
thing (or an arrangement of things) can tend determinately.
Clear and helpful though this first argument is, it raises a problem that
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is apparently deepened by developments later in the chapter. For, aside
from separated or purely intellective substances, every created thing, in-
cluding every human being, eventually dies or otherwise ceases to exist.86
‘Simple corruption’ is Aquinas’s generic designation for the end of individ-
ual creaturely existence: “All corruption occurs through a separation of
form from matter—simple corruption through the separation of the substan-
tial form, of course, but corruption in a certain respect through the separation
of an accidental form” (II.55.1298). Coffee’s cooling or clay’s hardening is
corruption of the coffee or the clay in a certain respect as a human being’s
dying, the separating of the soul from the body, is simple corruption.
Because all material created things are constantly subject to corruption in
a certain respect and eventually succumb to simple corruption, it seems
right to say that every material created thing tends toward its own corrup-
tion, which is something determinate. Against that background, look again
at these sentences from the argument we’re considering: “But that toward
which an agent tends determinately must be appropriate for it, since the
agent wouldn’t tend toward it if it weren’t somehow appropriate for itself.
But whatever is appropriate for anything is good for it” (3.1879). Now
Aquinas emphatically denies that the corruption of any thing is good for
that thing. As he says later in this same chapter, “all natural agents, to the
extent of their power, resist corruption, which is bad for each and every
thing”  (3.1885).87 If  any thing’s  corruption  is bad for  it, and  if every
material created thing tends toward its own corruption, then it isn’t true
that “that toward which an agent tends determinately must be appropriate
for it.”88
What’s gone wrong here? It’s not that Aquinas thinks that an agent
can’t tend toward and resist the same thing at the same time, since he of
course believes that a person can resist temptation.89 And I can’t see how
‘tends determinately’ might make the crucial difference, since there’s noth-
ing indeterminate about an agent’s simple corruption or about its tending
toward that end. Nor do I think that I’ve created the problem by interpret-
ing ‘tends toward’ too broadly, since Aquinas’s use of that term here must
cover all the naturally necessitated tendencies of non-living agents as well
as the deliberated, freely chosen plans of intellective agents. Still, what a
thing tends toward does seem to include the actualizing of its passive
potentialities as well as of its active powers, and the natural corruption of a
thing, especially its simple corruption, results essentially from the actualiz-
ing of some of its passive potentialities rather than being brought about by
its exercising its active powers. So perhaps this problem is caused by Aqui-
nas’s use of ‘tends toward’ here rather than, say, ‘acts for,’ another term he
often uses in this context.90
I want to consider just two others of the nine arguments supporting the
goodness thesis in III.3. The seventh argument provides simple but effective
support for the thesis by drawing on the notion of badness, which occupies
Aquinas’s attention over the next thirteen chapters.91
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Avoiding what is bad and seeking what is good have the same nature,
in the same way as moving down and moving up have the same na-
ture.92 But we find that all things avoid what is bad. For things that act
through intellect avoid something because they apprehend it as bad,
while all natural agents, to the extent of their power, resist corruption,
which is bad for each and every thing. Therefore, all things act for
something good. (3.1885)
Things that act through intellect, including us, may sometimes, at their best,
avoid what they apprehend as bad for future generations, or bad absolutely,
even though advantageous for themselves. But each of them must, if the
individual is to survive, avoid on most occasions what the individual appre-
hends as bad for itself. And since corruption “is bad for each and every
thing,” and since a human being’s avoidance of corruption entails eating,
and since eating entails the corrupting of something else, an agent’s avoid-
ing of what is bad for itself will often entail not merely its seeking what is
good for itself but, thereby and at the same time, what is bad for something
else. However, as we’ve seen in discussing Aquinas’s broad and cool sense
of ‘peccatum,’93 and as I discuss in detail in Chapter III below, his analysis of
badness is characterized throughout (quite properly, I think) by clinical
detachment—an approach that provides grounds for rationally accepting
certain sorts of badness even while acknowledging their badness. Not sur-
prisingly, this approach is less easy to appreciate at the level of moral
judgment than at the metaphysical level. But, as we’ll see, the analysis
develops from the metaphysical level, where we begin by understanding
that “every actuality has the defining characteristic of goodness (boni), since
badness (malum) is found only in a potentiality that falls short of actuality”
(3.1883),94 and that the generation of any one thing involves the corrup-
tion of another,95 and that for very many things, including us, their preser-
vation involves the destruction of very many other things.
As Aquinas’s seventh and fifth arguments in defense of his goodness
thesis introduce the notion of badness, so the eighth introduces the notion
of chance, which is also important in his consideration of providence in
Book III.
Whatever results from any agent’s action but is apart from (praeter ) the
agent’s intention is said to happen by chance or fortune. Now in the
works of nature we observe that what is for the better is what happens
either always or usually (frequentius). For instance, in plants the leaves
are arranged in a way that protects the fruit, and the parts of animals
are disposed so that the animal can protect itself. Therefore, if this sort
of thing happens apart from the intention of a natural agent, it will be
by chance or fortune. But that’s impossible, since it is not things that
happen always or often (frequenter) that are by chance or fortuitous, but
rather those that happen very seldom (in paucioribus) [Physics II 5,
196b10-17]. Therefore, a natural agent tends toward what is for the
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better. And, much more obviously, so  does one that  acts through
intellect. Therefore, every agent in acting intends something good.96
(3.1886)
The value of this argument, as I see it, lies not in the support it provides
for the goodness thesis but in what it tells us about Aquinas’s notion of
chance. It presents two aspects of that notion: (1) what results from any
agent’s action but is apart from the agent’s intention happens by chance;
(2) what happens by chance happens very seldom. (1) looks too broad and
too strong to be true. What about the practical joker who really didn’t
intend to injure his victim by pulling her chair out from under her as she
was sitting down? Would Aquinas really be prepared to say that her injuries
are just bad luck? No, as he shows later, when he refines (2), the frequency
condition, in a way that affects (1) and limits the range of acceptable
excuses:
it’s important to know that not everything that is apart from intention
must be fortuitous or by chance. . . . For if what is apart from intention
is something that always or often results from what is intended, then it
will not happen fortuitously or by chance. For instance, in the case of a
person who intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, if drunkenness
follows from the drinking of the wine, that will not be fortuitous or by
chance. If that resulted in [only] a few cases, however, then it would be
by chance.97 (III.5&6.1902)
As for (2), what happens by chance happens very seldom, it’s clearly
more fundamental to his notion than (1) is, as can be seen in the later
passage just quoted. And it seems unobjectionable. If lightning strikes the
same spot always or very often, then we’ll look for a causal explanation of a
result that we’re not in those circumstances prepared to describe as chance.
But in applying his notion of chance to phenomena of natural selection,
Aquinas seems to be making a mistake in reasoning. He cites the facts that
in plants the leaves are arranged always or usually in a way that protects the
fruit, and that the parts of animals are disposed always or usually so that the
animal can protect itself. But these facts could, for anything Aquinas says
here, result from a unique chance mutation in the past that was advanta-
geous for the individual plant or animal in which it occurred—a mutation
such that the progeny of those individuals had an advantage in surviving
and reproducing, with the result that the once-unique, chance charac-
teristic is now found in members of those species always or usually.98
One reason for thinking that this criticism may not apply so neatly to
this argument is that, immediately after introducing those examples of
natural goods, Aquinas says that “if this sort of thing happens apart from
the intention of a natural agent, it will be by chance or fortune.” Since ‘a
natural agent’ could just as readily be translated as ‘the natural agent,’ other
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things being equal, someone might be inclined to think that Aquinas is here
alluding to God as the governor of his creation. But since ‘agens naturale’ in
this discussion has until now meant some created natural agent, that would
constitute a very surprising and confusing shift in Aquinas’s terminology.99
Besides, in this case other things are not equal, as can be seen from the way
Aquinas distinguishes between natural and intellective agents at the and of
the argument: “Therefore, a natural agent tends toward what is for the
better. And, much more obviously, so does one that acts through intellect.”
And God, of course, is the paradigmatic, perfect intellective agent.100
III. BADNESS
1. The Badness Thesis
‘Badness’ is not a good word. It sounds faintly infantile, perhaps especially
now, at the end of the twentieth century. Still, ‘imperfection’ and its bland
companions are too broad to serve all the purposes of this investigation,
while ‘evil,’ ‘wickedness,’ ‘immorality,’ ‘sinfulness,’ and the like are even
more clearly too narrow. ‘Malum’ is almost the only word Aquinas uses,
adjectivally or as a nominalized adjective, for the central notion in III.4–15,
a series of chapters that has sometimes been called a treatise de malo.101 And
‘bad’ and ‘badness’ are the only English words that strike me as coming
close to playing all the roles Aquinas assigns to ‘malum.’ With that semi-sat-
isfactory bit of terminological equipment we can start an investigation of his
treatise on badness.
It begins in III.4 with what I’ll call the badness thesis: “Now on that
basis it is apparent that the badness in things, events, or states of affairs
occurs apart from the intention of their agents (Ex hoc autem apparet quod
malum in rebus incidit praeter intentionem agentium)” (3.1889). I’ve expanded
Aquinas’s one word ‘rebus’ into the phrase ‘things, events, or states of
affairs.’ It’s usually translated most safely as ‘things,’ but I think that the
generality implicit in it needs to be spelled out in that way here, and
occasionally elsewhere. Aquinas’s reference to “the badness in things,
events, or states of affairs” rather than merely badness for the agent appears
to generalize and objectify the kinds of badness at issue. The introductory
formula ‘on that basis,’ already familiar from the beginnings of many earlier
chapters in SCG I–III, refers in this case to the goodness thesis for which he
argued in the preceding chapter. If, as his first formulation of the goodness
thesis maintains, “every agent acts for what is good,” then no agent acts for
what is bad; and so the badness that does undeniably mar many things,
events, and states of affairs can’t be what their agents act for; it must
therefore occur apart from their agents’ intention. Viewed in this way, the
126 NORMAN KRETZMANN
